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Book Review

Viewing September 11 Through the Lens
of History
September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? Edited by Mary
L. Dudziak, Duke University Press, 2003.

Reviewed by Carol L. Chomskyt
The events of September 11, 2001 stunned America and
the world. Four nearly simultaneous airplane hijackings, the
collapse of the World Trade Center towers, the attack directly
on the heart of the U.S. military command, the presumed but
thwarted effort to fly one of the planes into the White House,
and the sheer number of casualties combined to shock those
who watched the events unfold. It felt as though a seismic
change has occurred, in America and the world. In the days and
weeks that followed, many of the commentaries and much conversation centered on that premise, as Mary Dudziak notes in
her introduction to the essays collected in September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? Examples were everywhere. "Nothing Will Ever Be the Same," a PhiladelphiaCity Paperheadline
declared in a special September 11 edition.' "[T]he known
world had been jerked aside like a mere slide in a projector,
and a new world had been rammed into its place," wrote Jonathan Schell a month later in the Nation.2 The banner at
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to
the reference staff of the University of Minnesota Law Library for their research assistance and to the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for
their assistance through the editorial process. My thanks also to Steven Liss
for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Mary L. Dudziak, Introduction to SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A
WATERSHED MOMENT? 2 (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER
11] (referencing Howard Altman et al., Nothing Will Ever Be the Same, PHILA.
CITY PAPER, Sept. 13, 2001, available at http://citypaper.net/articles/091301/
cov.wtcl.shtml).
2. Marilyn B. Young, Ground Zero: Enduring War, in SEPTEMBER 11,
supra note 1, at 11 (quoting Jonathan Schell, Letter from Ground Zero, THE
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www.septemberllnews.com, the self-proclaimed "Internet's #1
Resource for September 11th, 2001 News," reads "September
11, 2001-The Day the World Changed."3 CBSNews.com declares "9/11 the day that changed America." 4 And the Houston
Chronicle memorialized the events three years later under the
banner "Our Changed World."5
Published just after the American invasion of Iraq in
March 2003, but largely written and edited before that date,
the collection of essays in September 11 in History asks us to
step back and consider whether September 11 is indeed, or will
ultimately be viewed as, a transformative event in American
history. In her introduction, Dudziak asks:
Would it become an iconic historical event, marking a transition in
the history of the United States and of the world? Or was it instead
best understood as an aspect of pre-existing historical trajectories?

Did it change law, politics, religion, and culture, or did it instead simply provide a new site for political and cultural conflicts that were already in play?6
Two-now three-years after September 11, 2001 hardly
provide the historical distance that will ultimately be required
to resolve such issues with finality, but it is worth asking the
questions and seeking at least preliminary answers now. The
argument that the events of September 11 changed at least our
world has been used to justify responses such as the enactment
of the USA Patriot Act and its erosion of domestic civil liberties,
detention and deportation of foreign nationals without hearings, and denial that the Geneva Convention applies to treatment of alleged terrorists. 7 In the face of such a claim, and the
rhetoric at its core, it seems vital to ask what really has
changed. The essays in this volume prove the value of seeking
such perspective, even in these early days. No doubt scholars,
policymakers, pundits, and the public will continue to ask the
NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, availableat http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?
i=20011015&s=schell).
3. September
11,
2001-The
Day
the
World
Changed,
SEPTEMBER1lNEwS.coM, at http://www.septemberllnews.com (last visited

Feb. 14, 2005).
4. 9/11: The Day that Changed America, CBSNEWS.COM, at http://
www.cbsnews.com/sections/septemberll/main500249.shtml

(last visited Feb.

1, 2005).
5. Our Changed World: Remembering September 11, HOUSTON CHRON.
(Sept. 11, 2004), available at http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/
02/septl 1/index.html.
6. Dudziak, supra note 1, at 2.
7. See Part HI, infra.
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question posed here, and a national and international dialogue
on the issue will continue. These essays provide a firm beginning for that effort, and the issues they raise, as well as the
analyses they provide, will continue to be important contributions to the ongoing debate.
The nine essays in this collection range widely, addressing
four broadly defined subjects: the language we use to describe
the events and the impact of such usage on our understanding;
the history of Islamic doctrine and the implications of that history; the impact of September 11 on domestic understandings
and policies; and the evolution of international law under the
impetus of September 11 and its aftermath. Overall, the authors suggest many more continuities than discontinuities,
more evolution than revolution, despite the language of transformation with which September 11 has been described. Seeing
the events and the rhetoric surrounding September 11 as a reflection of familiar debates and disputes may help us respond
more coherently, critically, and fruitfully, in keeping with historically grounded American interests and concerns.
I. RHETORIC AND HISTORY
The first three articles consider the language in which public officials and commentators began to talk about the events of
September 11, how that language resonated with moments of
American history, and the ways in which that resonance served
to align our understanding of and responses to the attacks. In
8
Ground Zero: Enduring War, Marilyn Young writes that the
events of September 11 did not constitute a "historical water9
shed" as initial commentaries suggested. Certainly, the existence of terrorism was not new, whether directed at Americans
or others around the world. As Young observes, "[t]he only new
aspect of this act of terror was its happening in the United
States, whose citizens had imagined themselves invulnerable." 10 Perhaps that might have led the public to "a renewed
sense of self-sacrifice, civic responsibility, and ethical commitment,"'1 helping to transform the American character and the

8. Young is a professor of history at New York University and director of
the Project on the Cold War as Global Conflict at the International Center for
Advanced Studies at New York University.
9. See Young, supra note 2, at 11-12.

10. Id.
11.

Id.
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American sense of connection with the rest of the world. 12 In
keeping with that theme of civic responsibility, at least on the
domestic front, President Bush called for citizen commitment to
public service and to volunteering in local communities to support those in need as well as to respond to security concerns. 13
But such calls quickly expired in a return to normalcy. In the
same speech in which he called for self-sacrifice, the President
suggested that the "ultimate repudiation of terrorism" is "1l]ife
in America... going forward," in people "going about their
daily lives, working and shopping and playing, worshipping
[sic] at churches and synagogues and mosques, going to movies
and to baseball games."1 4
And indeed, Young reports, "the country became even more
itself, almost to the point of caricature."'15 The American sense
of its place in the world moved backward, not forward, she contends. Young notes that "[tihe world that had seemed to crumble with the Berlin Wall in 1989 reappeared, a little dusty.
Good and Evil, Us and Them, Enemies Everywhere."16 The revival of Cold War metaphors, Young suggests, helped support
"revivification"'17 of Cold War tactics in programs like Operation
TIPS (encouraging plumbers, letter carriers, utility workers,
and others to report "suspicious activity" by calling a toll-free
number)' 8 and the Office of Strategic Influence (bringing Hollywood executives together with administration officials to plan
propaganda efforts abroad, including disinformation).19 "Nongovernmental witch-hunters set up organizations to monitor
thought," including the American Council of Trustees and
Alumni, headed by Lynne Cheney, which published a list of
over 100 academics "guilty" of criticizing U.S. foreign policy. 20
All of these efforts were short lived, but the vision of an ultimate war of good against evil persists. The 'long, indefinite
struggle against godless Communism" had been replaced by "a
12. See id.
13. President George W. Bush, Address to America Before Representatives of Firemen, Law Enforcement Officers, and Postal Workers in Atlanta,
Georgia (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.septemberllnews.com/
PresidentBushAtlanta.htm.
14. Id.
15. Young, supra note 2, at 11.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 12-13.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id. at 13.
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21
struggle of indefinite duration against terrorism." Like the
earlier struggle, the new struggle brings with it assertions that
the threat requires new and more stringent law enforcement
tools and allegations that criticism of American policy in general, and the war in particular, will give aid and comfort to the
enemy.

22

Young also suggests that, like Harry Truman, who used
the excuse of the Korean War to pass legislation tripling the defense budget-a result desired but not likely attainable before
that war 23-the Bush administration is using the threat of terrorism to implement policies of unilateralism favored by the
administration but not likely to have enjoyed broad support before September 11.24 Young asserts that
[t]here has been a shift from the recognition of the fact of American
preponderance of power to an insistence on maintaining exclusive
power; from a multilateral vocabulary, however honored mostly in the
breach, to an unabashed unilateralist posture; from an understanding
of physics in which a balance requires a fulcrum to one in which exclusive American power constitutes a balanced world. September 11
did not change the world; but it has enabled the Bush administration
policies that
to pursue, with less opposition and greater 2violence,
5
might otherwise have appeared too aggressive.

As examples, Young points to international policies such as a
declaration of expanded circumstances in which nuclear weapons may be used and a preemptive war strategy subsequently
used to justify the invasion of Iraq, 26 as well as domestic policies such as new stringency in releasing documents under the
Freedom of Information Act and more severe limitations on
public access to presidential papers. 27 At base, Young suggests,
ft]he meaning of September 11 for most people seems to be that the
world is a dangerous place and that the government of this country,
by a careful examination of its own policies and behavior, might contribute to making it a marginally less dangerous place. The meaning

21. Id. at 14.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 14-18.
25. Id. at 18.
26. See id. at 19. Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning for the State
Department, describes the administration's policy as one of 'limited sovereignty," allowing preemptive action when "you have grounds to think it's a
question of when, and not if, you're going to be attacked." Id., quoted in Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order,NEW YORKER, Apr. 1, 2002, at 46.
27. Id. at 18-19.
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of September 11 for the Bush administration, by contrast, seems to be
the conviction that it can control the world. 28

Though she does not say so in so many words, Young's essay suggests that, although the events of September 11 did not
of themselves mark a transformational moment in the history
of the United States or the world, they may yet be used in ways
that will create transformation. Much depends on how radical
the proposals of the Bush administration are, and whether the
rhetoric of transformation succeeds in convincing legislators
and the public of the need for and desirability of further unprecedented steps in response. The Bush administration appears to have interpreted the election results from November
2004 as a mandate for its agenda, 29 despite the doubts on that
score evident in the election results and in subsequent polls of
public attitudes. 30 How that attitude will translate to action
remains to be seen. The dynamics of a lame-duck administration, an overextended military, and challenges to the administration's domestic agenda also may bring countervailing influ31
ences.
Elaine Tyler May 32 titles her essay Echoes of the Cold War:
The Aftermath of September 11 at Home.33 Like Young, May
sees the nation's leaders, commentators, and the public searching the past for "reference points" and historical antecedents
for September 11, even as they continue to call the event itself
unprecedented. 34 Drawing on the idea of "'frames of acceptance' articulated by cultural critic Kenneth Burke, May de28. Id. at 27.
29. See Marc Sandalow, Bush Claims Mandate, Sets 2nd-Term Goals, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 5, 2004, at Al; Richard W. Stevenson, After a Tense Night, Bush
Spends the Day Basking in Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at 3; Kenneth T.
Walsh, The Man with the Mandate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 15, 2004,

at 34, 38.
30. See Will Lester & Scott Lindlaw, Poll: 49% Approve of Job Bush Doing; Same Percent Says PresidentLacking, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2005, at 13. According to the Washington Post, President Bush "won with the smallest margin of any reelected president in more than a century, and his approval rating
as he began his second term.., was the lowest of any in modern times." Peter
Baker & Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Pledges To Spread Freedom, WASH. POST,
Jan. 21, 2005, at Al.
31. See, e.g., David A. Sanger, Hawk Sightings Could Be Premature,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 4, at 1.
32. May is a professor of history and American studies at the University
of Minnesota.
33. Elaine Tyler May, Echoes of the Cold War: The Aftermath of September 11 at Home, in SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 1, at 35.
34.

Id.
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scribes a process by which those responding to an event use an
"old frame" to provide the "parameters of response" to a new
crisis. But the old frame rarely fits the new events precisely, so
the old frame "will be extended to meet the new necessities by
casuistic stretching." 35 Thus when officials, commentators, and
others call upon the imagery of Pearl Harbor, World War II,
and the Cold War, May asks whether those "reference points"
36
are "appropriate or even useful." What limitations grow out of

seeing the events of September 11 as similar to those earlier
events? Would different historical connections have suggested
different responses?
May suggests that the imagery of "ground zero" and of
Pearl Harbor evokes the "apocalyptic nightmares of the atomic
age," 37 and identifies the events of September 11 as part of a

war.38 Looking back now, after the invasions of Afghanistan
and Iraq, the war imagery seems undeniable, but May suggests
that the imagery used may have helped trap us into choosing
one frame of reference (attack as war) over other possible
39
frames (attack as terrorist and criminal act). That narrowed
our options and channeled our perceptions towards one form of
response over others. Comparing the attack on September 11 to
Pearl Harbor meant that a declaration of war was the appropriate response. 40 The choice of identifying the acts and the
United States' response as "war" also forced nations to be either
our allies or our enemies. 41 By viewing the attack on September
11 as an act of "war" rather than an international and domestic
crime, May says, the criminal perpetrators were given some
42
degree of legitimacy, some status as a legitimate enemy, even

though at the same time the administration hastened to deny
the legitimacy of the attack and those who orchestrated it.
Moreover, declaring "war" against terrorism made Bush a wartime president. 43 'War, if it has widespread support, has al-

35.
(3d ed.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. (quoting KENNETH
1984)).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 36-37.
See id. at 38-40, 41.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 40.
See id. at 40-41.

BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD HISTORY

132-33
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ways contributed to the popularity of presidents. Crime has
done just the opposite," May notes. 44
Despite the initial reliance on the Pearl Harbor parallel, it
was the Cold War imagery that prevailed as our frame of reference:
[The villains seemed to personify the characteristics of the Communist threat: foreigners who infiltrated the nation, studied our technology, and used our own power against us. They blended into society,
plotting against us while enjoying the good life they professed to disdain. They turned our own proud monuments of postwar technological
and consumer triumph, commercial airliners and towering skyscrapers, into the means of our destruction. Like the suspected Communist
spy, they represented the enemy within, loyal to a foreign foe. 45

The administration responded largely in Cold War fashion, urging citizens to spy on the enemy within, 46 charging that criticism of the government was unpatriotic and would aid the enemy, 47 focusing intensely on "homeland security," 48 and

identifying an "axis of evil." 49 One thing quickly lost in the Cold

War invocation of good versus evil and the rhetoric of war was
any attempt to explore the role of the United States in the
world and the real sociopolitical sources of the hatred that
manifested itself in the attacks of September 11. "[W]hy do
they hate us?" President Bush asked in his address to a joint
session of Congress on September 20, 2001, echoing the question asked by many Americans. 50 But his answer ignored any

inquiry into the actions of America in the Middle East and
elsewhere, identified by other commentators as a major source
of hostility. 51 He focused, instead, on the imagery of good and

44. Id. at 40.
45. Id. at 42.
46. Id. at 50.
47. Id. at 48-49.
48. See id. at 45-46, 49-51.
49. Id. at 45. May notes the resonance of "homeland security" with the age
of the civil defense bureaucracy of the Cold War era and the linguistic and
emotional connections between the "Axis of Evil" and both the Soviet Union as
the "Evil Empire" of Ronald Reagan and the "Axis Powers" of World War II.
Id.
50. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
51. Michiko Kakutani, A Dark View of U.S. Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2004, at E25 (reviewing ANONYMOUS, IMPERIAL HUBRIS (2004)). Imperial Hubris was written by a current CIA agent, and takes the view that Osama bin
Laden does not seek to destroy us because he "hates our values, freedoms and
ideas," but rather "'because of our policies and actions in the Muslim world,"'
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evil. "They hate our freedoms-our freedom of religion, our
freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other," President Bush intoned. "They are the
heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century....
[T]hey follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totali52
tarianism."
By using familiar "'frames of acceptance,"' such as Pearl
Harbor and the Cold War, policymakers and citizens alike
could "react to an unfamiliar situation in familiar ways," May
argues. 53 But lost in that process is any searching inquiry into
the success or, more telling, failure of those responses in their
historical context and how well (or badly) the metaphors and
imagery of that earlier era fit the current situation. May leaves
us on the brink of that analysis, but much more is necessary
before we can truly understand the choices made and foreclosed
by relying on the imagery of the past.
In her essay, Homeland Insecurities: Transformations of
Language and Space, Amy Kaplan 54 focuses on how three
"spaces"--"ground zero," the "homeland," and "Guantanamo
Bay"-have been represented in the aftermath of September
11.55 She writes about how those representations not only help
to shape our understanding of the events, but also how they are
"mapping, blurring, and reconstructing the conceptual, affective, and symbolic borders between spheres once thought of as
citing a set of "clear, focused and limited foreign policy goals." See
also Raghida Derham, Letter From America: Divided Lives, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
15, 2001, at 54 ("[Mlost Arabs do not hate them. They do, however, have legitimate issues with American policies .... ); Mary McGrory, "Nuancing"the
Mideast Dilemma, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2002, at B7 (citing a Zogby poll that
"shows that Arabs love American music, movies, clothes, democracy and freedom-but hate our attitude toward Palestine'); Robert Satloff, Voices Who
Speak for (and Against) Us, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at B4 ("Instead of recognizing that millions of Muslims dislike Americans because of the alleged injustice of our policies on contentious issues such as terrorism, Iraq and Israel,
we have chosen to believe that if only Muslims knew us better--our society,
values and culture-they would hate us less."); Elaine Sciolino, Aftermath: Invaders: Who Hates the U.S.? Who Loves It?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, § 4, at
1 ("'They don't hate us because we have a Congress... [t]hey hate us because
we seem so indifferent to their problems and their suffering"') (quoting Jon B.
Alterman, analyst for the United States Institute of Peace)).
52. Bush, supra note 50.
53. May, supra note 33, at 52.
54. Kaplan is a professor of English and American studies at the University of Pennsylvania.
55. Amy Kaplan, Homeland Insecurities: Transformations of Language
and Space, in SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 1, at 55.
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distinctly separate, as either national or international, domestic or foreign, 'at home' or 'abroad."' 56 Despite what may seem
at the outset a foray into linguistic theory, Kaplan's discussion
taps into the same historical tropes invoked by Young and May,
and deepens the reflection about the ways in which the words
we use create understandings beyond the explicit.
"Ground zero," she notes, entered our lexicon in 1946. 57 Referring literally to "'the point directly above, below, or at which
a nuclear explosion occurs,"' its metaphoric meaning extends to
"'the center or origin of rapid, intense, or violent activity or
change."' 58 Repeated over and over, it reflects but also evokes
the sense that September 11 radically altered the world, that
the events and the space of ground zero cataclysmically
changed us.59 Even while invoking the history of the atomic
bomb, Kaplan suggests, we have ignored the natural connections to the particular history of the American use of the atomic
bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "the experience of a sudden
horrific attack on civilians in an urban center."60 To acknowledge the connection with Hiroshima and Nagasaki "would
trouble the.., binary oppositions.., erected on that ground,
between before and after, between being with us or with the
terrorists, between the American way of life and the 'axis of
evil."' 61 So the language selectively invokes history, bringing
metaphoric historical baggage while claiming the events as
unique and out of history.6 2
"Homeland," Kaplan suggests, is notable for its lack of connection with American history, though not without implications
arising from its historical usage in other contexts.6 3 Although
connoting "an inexorable connection to a place deeply rooted in
the past," the word "homeland" is not deeply rooted in America's past, or in past American usage.6 4 Americans of all origins
may view America as their home, Kaplan writes, but the notion
of "homeland" is often connected instead to some other place,

56. Id.
57. Id. at 56.
58.

Id. (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 552 (11th

ed. 2003)).
59.

Id.

60. Id. at 57.
61. Id.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 56-57.
See id. at 58-64.
See id. at 58.
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65
their "historical, ethnic, or spiritual homeland." But while the
word is not connected to our history, it does carry with it emous even
tional sensibilities, serving paradoxically to divide
66

though its presumed intent is to bring us together.

It commu-

nicates, she suggests, several strains of meaning,
put[ting] into play a history of multiple meanings, connotations, and
associations that work on the one hand to convey a sense of unity, security, and stability, but more profoundly, on the other hand, work to
threats of the
generate forms of radical insecurity by proliferating
67
foreign lurking within and without national borders.

The use of "homeland" thus helps to construct more definite borders, to distinguish between domestic and foreign, and
at the same time to make claims for a unitary domestic sphere
(always referred to as the homeland), as opposed to "pluralistic
definitions of national identity."68 The word "homeland" carries
with it, Kaplan suggests, a connotation of racial purity, because
of its linguistic connection with the effort in South Africa to establish black "homelands" and its evocation of the "motherland"
69
and "fatherland" associated with Germany's fascist past.
"Homeland" suggests a commonality of ancestry and history,
not just a common political allegiance, and therefore serves to
70
It offers
reinforce an exclusionary reaction to immigrants.
linguistic support, then, to the political and legal policies that
have resulted in detentions and deportations of thousands of
immigrants, as well as the enfolding of the enforcement division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service into the
Department of Homeland Security and its implicit statement
that immigrants should be seen as a threat to the security of
71
the (our and not their) homeland. The sense of insecurity is
compounded by the connection of the phrase with communities
who aspire to nationhood but do not yet have homelands-such
as the Palestinian, Kurdish, Sikh, Tamil, and Basque peoples65. Id.
66. See id. at 58-61.
67. Id. at 64.
68. Id. at 59.
69. See id. at 61-62. Kaplan reports that, in October 2002, an advertisement was placed in Texas Monthly magazine by the Texas Homeland Security
chief. Presumably unintentionally, but perhaps revealingly, the backdrop to
the advertisement's text was a military officer standing in front of an American flag-unremarkable until people noticed that the officer was a German
Luftwaffe officer, "complete with military decorations, insignias, and a name
tag bearing the German flag." Id. at 62.
70. Id. at 61.
71. Id.
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and also with the nostalgic idea of homeland as "a place you
came from-no matter how long ago-and long to go back to
but cannot ever really return to."72 The constant invocation of
"homeland security" reinforces the insecurity by depicting the
homeland itself as a "battleground," one that must always be
alert to the danger within. 73
Kaplan perhaps stretches too far when she concludes that
"[t]he notion of 'the homeland' draws on comforting images of a
deeply rooted past to legitimate modern forms of imperial

power," 74 but she is surely right to call us to explore the com-

plexities of meaning embedded in the idea of "homeland" and
its subconscious effect on our understanding of both this historical moment and our responses to government policies implemented in defense of it. While some may find the connections she identifies as strained, her explanations helped at
least this reviewer put words to an immediate and seemingly
visceral discomfort with the use of the term "homeland." Deep
linguistic references of this sort are often not obvious; naming
them may help us to see the invisible and to dissipate some of
their power.
Kaplan concludes with a section discussing the "anomalous"7 5 space of Guantanamo Bay, where the U.S. government

has claimed both complete control over the territory and the
absence of the kind of "sovereignty" that warrants the application of U.S. constitutional guarantees to protect the prisoners
held there. 76 She sees this "floating colony" as an image that
serves, like "homeland," to blur the distinctions between foreign
and domestic. 77 At the time the book went to press, the legal
status of Guantanamo had been reviewed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, which affirmed the government's right to deal with the prisoners without recourse to
the laws of the United States.7 8 The Supreme Court later overturned that judgment in a six-to-three decision, ruling that
U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear the prisoners' claims that

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
2003),

Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 68.
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144-45 (D.C. Cir.
rev'd sub noma. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
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their detention was illegal7 9 and rejecting at least some aspects
of the government claims of exceptional status for prisoners at
Guantanamo. But the importance of considering how language-and policy-have the effect of "mapping, blurring, and
reconstructing... conceptual, affective, and symbolic borders
between spheres once thought of as distinctly separate"8 0 is reinforced by administration efforts to define prisoners in Iraq as
outside the protections of the Geneva Convention,8 ' to argue
that torture may be permitted to extract information from prisoners in Iraq, and to classify Yaser Hamdi, Richard Reid, and
Jose Padilla as "enemy combatants" not entitled to constitutional protections, despite their presence in the United States
(and, in the case of Padilla, even despite U.S. citizenship).
Taken together, the three initial essays demonstrate the
ways in which the events of September 11 connect with our historical past, even while policymakers continue to claim exceptionalism and a break with that past. They remind us of the
subtle power of language to shape human reactions and understandings, and the need to question the assumptions buried in
that language. They do not answer the question whether September 11 was transformative, but they provide a richer sense
of the landscape within which to consider the question. Finally,
they warn of the potential that September 11 may become
transformative in part because we (or our leaders) declare and
treat it so and then use the declaration as an argument for creating that very transformation.
II. ISLAM AND HISTORY
The next two essays shift the focus of inquiry and ask
whether the .events of September 11 mark, or will mark, a
transformation of Islamic theology. They provide a much more
complex and nuanced vision of Islam than generally appears in
Western public policy discussions. In the process, they present
79. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698-99. Finding jurisdiction was only the first
step, of course. The Supreme Court found jurisdiction in the federal courts to
hear habeas corpus claims by prisoners, thereby mandating some form of
hearings for detainees, but the level of scrutiny by the federal courts remains
unsettled. Id. ('Whether and what further proceedings may become necessary
after respondents make their response to the merits of petitioners' claims are
matters that we need not address now."). The first federal district court to rule
on the claims of individual detainees in light of Rasul rejected all arguments
by the petitioners. See discussion infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
80. Kaplan, supra note 55, at 55.
81.

Id. at 65.
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a view of Islam that should resonate with legal audiences, especially those trained in the realist common law tradition.
"[M]eaning in Islam," writes Khaled Abou El Fadl,8 2 "is acquired through the formation of communities of interpretation."8 3 He describes how the theology of Osama bin Laden-

even though it is "at odds with the main interpretive communities of classical Islam" 8 4-- could nevertheless operate to renegotiate the meaning of Islam. 85 El Fadl continues:
Whether one likes it or not, and for better or worse, what a Muslim
does in the name of Islam is in fact a part of the Islamic experience.... Although one can plausibly maintain that bin Laden's be-

havior was foremost an act of vengeance against a modern reality
that has increasingly alienated and marginalized Muslims, and that
the classical literary sources of Islam do not support his vengeful behavior, the fact remains that what bin Laden did does have normative
value. If Muslims do not succeed in debunking, rejecting, and marginalizing bin Laden's behavior, his ideology, vengeful as it is, will set
86
a normative precedent.

In Islam(s) East and West: Pluralism Between No-Frills
and Designer Fundamentalism, Sherman Jackson8 7 is even
more explicit about the nature of the process that results (or at
least in the past resulted) in interpretive validity in Islam. The
classical tradition, he says, credited procedure over substance
and was therefore willing "to countenance all manner of substantively repugnant views as long as these were derived (or
88
authenticated) through proper and recognized procedures."
Because only the Prophet is immune from interpretive error,
views of Islam could not be silenced as long as they were
grounded in authoritative and authentic sources and based on
recognized interpretive methods-unless they contradicted a
preexisting unanimous consensus of the juridical community,

82. El Fadl is an acting professor at UCLA School of Law and the Omar
and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law.
83. Khaled Abou El Fadl, 9/11 and the Muslim Transformation, in
SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 1, at 73.
84. Id. at 73. Bin Laden may claim to be offering a return to 'lost Islamic
authenticity," El Fadl writes, but in reality is presenting "a nihilistic response
to the postcolonial marginalization of Islam." Id. at 71-72.
85. Id. at 73.
86. Id.
87. Jackson is an associate professor of medieval Arabic law and theology
at the University of Michigan.
88. Sherman A. Jackson, Islam(s) East and West: Pluralism Between NoFrills and Designer Fundamentalism,in SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 1, at 112,
122.
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which is rare.8 9 Bin Laden's views about Islam thus follow a
history of "an embarrassingly broad range of lamentable, dangerous, or even downright repulsive views" that coexisted in the
Islamic community alongside views more acceptable to modern
Western sensibilities. 90 The views of bin Laden and others are
thus not as aberrational as some have suggested. The golden
age of Islam, in this description, was not grounded in a vision of
equality and justice as much as it was pluralistic and tolerant,
encompassing multiple and conflicting visions. 91 And Jackson
reminds us that the cost of such pluralism is that "[i]nsincere,
wrong-minded, and even repugnant views" cannot be repressed
or forbidden or "'shamed' away" by claiming them to be nonIslamic. 92 "Infelicitous views could only be displaced through
the production of other views that showed integrity to agreedon sources and methods and were broader and deeper in their
appeal within the interpretive community." 93 Described in this
fashion, the airing of views of Islam, including bin Laden's,
sounds much like our own constitutional jurisprudence and
commitment to evolving standards based on reference back to
authoritative texts. Jackson warns that the events of September 11 have motivated an effort to declare that Islam categorically condemns such terrorist acts, to establish a "false universal" that seeks to define Islam in conformity with ideals that
accord with Western notions of justice. 9 4 It would be more fruitful, he argues, for Western Muslims to discuss not a universal
Islam but the truth of Islam for particular interpretive communities and to focus as well on pragmatic arguments about the
impact of conduct engaged in by their coreligionists who act on
interpretations of Islam that seem correct for them but bring
retaliation from Western powers.
Both authors argue that the attacks of September 11-and
the theology that has been asserted to support them-were
shaped by sociopolitical realities, the "outgrowth of social and
political frustrations that have steadily grown since the onset
of modernity."9 5 Today's Islam, no less than historical Islam, is
a product of time, space, and community. What is Islamic de89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 123.
See id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 126.
El Fadl, supra note 83, at 72.
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pends on "neither a particular set of verses nor a particular set
of legal texts, nor even a particular interpretive method. It is
rather the history and experience of a particular people in a
particular time and in a particular part of the world." 96 That
view presents both risks and opportunities. Risks, because bin
Laden, like others before him who have claimed to speak in the
name of Islam, by that very act may shape Islam for the future.
Opportunities, because Islamic communities in the West may
argue and work in opposition to bin Laden's aims and methods
without the need to posit a universal and unitary image of Islam for widely different communities with entirely different experiences of interaction with the world. The actions undertaken
on September 11 reflect the world and religious view of a portion of the Islamic community, grown out of the postcolonial political and social realities of the Middle East. Whether they signal a transformation of Islam remains to be seen. As with
American political ideology and practice, the answer remains in
the hands of the relevant political community. For 'nonMuslims in the United States who cannot be a part of that particular conversation, the significance of the El Fadl and Jackson essays resides in the more nuanced view of the complexities
of Islam, the sources of "radical" Islamic theology, and the nature of the theological-and political--debate that needs to occur.
III. DOMESTIC LAW AND HISTORY
The next two essays shift focus once again, this time to the
impact of the events of September 11 on domestic law and policy. In The Citizen and the Terrorist, Leti Volpp 97 focuses on the
post-September 11 social construction of a racial category
(those who appear to be Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim) and
how that categorization helps to set the boundaries between
"American" and "foreign," between citizen and noncitizen. 98 The
events of September 11 have also brought back old (and, Volpp
argues, gendered) "Orientalist tropes," portraying the West as
civilized, modern, democratic, rational, and progressive and the
East as primitive, barbaric, despotic, and rooted in passion. 99
96.
97.
Law at
98.
note 1,
99.

Jackson, supra note 88, at 119.
Volpp is an associate professor of law at the Washington College of
American University.
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, in SEPTEMBER 11, supra
at 147-48.
Id. at 148, 153-54.
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She describes how, in the aftermath of September 11, racial
profiling emerged as a frequent and newly acceptable practice,
of
based on popular and government-reinforced understandings
"who is the terrorist and who is the citizen." 100 Despite statements warning people not to target members of particular racial groups, government actions spoke louder. Detention of noncitizens (most of whom were Middle Eastern, Muslim, or South
Asian), Department of Justice dragnet interviews of some 5000
male noncitizens from Middle Eastern or Islamic countries, accelerated deportations of noncitizens "from countries in which
there has been Al Qaeda terrorist presence or activity," and
special registration provisions for close to 100,000 male temporary visa holders, almost exclusively from Muslim countries, all
served to rationalize individual racially based action such as refusals to fly with airline passengers, or assaults against indi10 1
viduals who appeared to be Middle Eastern or Muslim. Even
violent assaults against those in the targeted racial group were
understood, even if not legally justified, as crimes of misdirected passion, she and others have suggested, distinguishing
them from hate crimes. Thus, Volpp notes, the murders of Matthew Shepard (a gay man tied to a wooden fence and brutalized
by two young straight men) and James Byrd (an African
American man chained to a pickup truck by two white men and
dragged for three miles) were crimes that were seen as morally
depraved and incomprehensible individual acts, while the murders of a Sikh Indian in Mesa, Arizona and two East Asian immigrants in Dallas were patriotic acts, in retaliation for what
was done to America. 10 2 Of course, the justifications offered by
the perpetrators do not establish community sentiment, and
each of the murders she describes evoked widespread community support for the victims and condemnations of the actions
and animus of the attackers. But just as the language of war
frames public reactions to September 11, so too, do the racial
characterizations by the government frame public sensibilities
about race and responsibility.
The effect of the racial categorization, Volpp suggests, has
been to redefine who is to be considered a citizen-not in terms
100. Id. at 150.
101. Id. at 148-50. As Volpp notes, the fact that racial profiling is underin-

clusive (Jose Padilla and Richard Reid do not fit the mold, for instance) and
overinclusive (the vast majority of those in the targeted racial category are not
terrorists) has not impeded its progress. Id. at 152.
102. See id. at 154.
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of formal legal status or legal rights, which are only part of the
notion of citizenship, 103 but in terms of identity and solidarity.
Who would turn around, she asks, rhetorically, to an imaginary
hail of "'Hey, you noncitizen!' (or foreigner, or enemy alien, or
terrorist)."'10 4 Even citizens who appear Middle Eastern, Arab,
or Muslim "do not stand in for or represent the nation," and by
being stripped of their sense of identity as "citizen," their attachment to citizenship rights and status is also reduced. 105
Those who are Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim and noncitizens stand even farther outside the orbit. "How can you guys
tell us that people who are not American citizens have rights?
Bull crap!" exhorted one caller to the hotline of the American
Civil Liberties Union after the Michigan chapter offered to "assist the 566 'men' the FBI contacted for investigatory interviews in the Detroit area." 106 "What makes you think these
people have rights? Those are Arabs; they have no rights. Deal
with it!" said another. 107 While these may not represent either
official government policy or accurate statements of the law,
they do likely represent the attitudes of large numbers of
Americans reacting to the imagery with which they have been
presented repeatedly since September 11. Among the transformative effects of the events of September 11 and their aftermath, then, are the changes in our images of our own community, who belongs and who does not, who is and who is not
entitled to be considered "citizens" of America in the broader
sense.
In their essay, Civil Liberties in the Dragons' Domain: Negotiating the Blurred Boundary Between Domestic Law and
Foreign Affairs After 9/11, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager 108 raise concerns about muddying the distinctions
between domestic and foreign as the administration crafts its
103.

Id. at 156. The formulation is based on the work of Linda Bosniak,

who suggests we should understand citizenship as consisting of four "distinct

discourses: citizenship as formal legal status, citizenship as rights, citizenship
as political activity, and citizenship as identity/solidarity." Id. at 156 (citing
Linda Bozniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
447, 456-88 (2000)).

104. Id. at 157.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 160.
108. Eisgruber is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Public Affairs at
the Woodrow Wilson School and the University Center for Human Values at
Princeton University. Sager is the Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair at
the University of Texas School of Law.
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policy on dealing with terrorists and as the courts struggle to
0 9
In blunt terms, they say that
determine what rules apply.'
the events of September 11 "made hash" of the boundaries between domestic law (an ordered, reasoned universe) and the international arena (an "unordered wilderness" ruled by "realpolitik rather than reason," where courts have traditionally
granted "almost complete discretion" to Congress and the president). 110 The antiterrorism measures adopted since September 11 "blend criminal law enforcement with immigration policy, foreign intelligence operations, and military force,""' and
the courts must venture into the relatively uncharted arena of
foreign affairs if they112are to maintain vigilance in their protection of civil liberties.
Eisgruber and Sager offer several examples of the "new,
113
The USA Patriot
mixed regime" conflating these boundaries.
Act allows more sharing of information between intelligence
and law enforcement agents, making it easier for the government to "spy" on people inside the United States and reversing
restrictions enacted in response to abuses perpetrated in the
1950s and 1960s. 114 The administration's declared policy of trying suspected terrorists in military tribunals without recourse
to American, foreign, or international courts, or of holding them
indefinitely as enemy combatants without recourse to any court
proceeding, challenges judicial ability to identify constitutional
115
And the government has inlimits on law enforcement.
creased its use of immigration regulation--detaining and deporting suspects, often by way of hearings considered nonappealable-thereby circumventing the protections that would be
available if the same immigrants were charged under domestic
criminal law. 16 The authors acknowledge that the mixing of
domestic policy and foreign affairs is hardly surprising in response to an event that itself involved both. Their point, rather,
is that "[i]f courts are to play any role in sculpting antiterrorism policy so that it respects civil liberties, they can no longer
109. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Civil Liberties in the
Dragons' Domain: Negotiating the Blurred Boundary Between Domestic Law
and ForeignAffairs After 9/11, in SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 1, at 163.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 166-67.
113. Id. at 164.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 164-65.
116. See id. at 165.
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treat foreign affairs as terra incognita."117 Courts must be willing to enter the arena of foreign affairs, to deny the government
the free rein it has often been given in that sphere, or the government will be able to evade the protections so painstakingly
crafted into our constitutional law. Further, they say, Congress
must be a partner in that process, crafting limitations on the
exercise of federal power so that antiterrorism policy can both
be effective and respectful of civil liberties." 8 They suggest
three doctrinal concepts that may be particularly fruitful in
providing a check on government power: increased procedural
regulation of areas, like immigration, traditionally left to governmental discretion; sunshine provisions to ensure government accountability when it exercises discretionary authority;
and gatekeeping doctrines to limit the executive's discretion to
route cases from the criminal law to the foreign affairs track. 119
Eisgruber and Sager have been joined by others in a growing
body of commentary on the appropriate role of courts in times
of war and crisis. 120 Their central insight-that courts must rid
themselves of the tendency to view international and military
affairs as a chartless wilderness where only the executive may
venture-is an important and early contribution to the ongoing
discussion.
It appears that the courts have at least begun to venture
into the uncharted waters outlined by Eisgruber and Sager and
have demonstrated some willingness to challenge claims that
the government has authority to act unchecked in pursuit of
foreign policy and military objectives. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
for example, the Supreme Court rejected Bush administration
arguments that "'respect for separation of powers and the lim117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 167.
See id.
Id. at 167-68.
The issue of what the courts have been and should be doing with re-

spect to reviewing military and other government action in wartime has been
the subject of a growing body of commentary. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
MINIMALISM AT WAR (Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
No. 80, 2004), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/

80-crs.war.pdf; Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
and the Fight Against Terrorism,58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125 (2003); David Cole,

Judging the Next Emergency: JudicialReview and IndividualRights in Times
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003); Shira A. Scheindlin
& Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: JudicialResponsibility in a
Time of Crisis, 32 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1605 (2004); John C. Yoo, JudicialReview
and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427 (2003).
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ited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military
decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict"' ought
to eliminate entirely any individual review of the factual basis
for the government's judgment that a U.S. citizen is an enemy
combatant. 12 1 Concurring, Justice Souter particularly criticized
the government's "mixed claim of inherent, extrastatutory authority under a combination of Article II of the Constitution
and the usages of war," reiterating Justice Jackson's observation that "the President is not Commander in Chief of the country, only of the military."'122 He noted that decisions about what
degree of liberty is compatible with wartime exigency are "not
well entrusted to the Executive Branch... whose particular re123
sponsibility is to maintain security." Justices Scalia and Stevens also rejected the government's claims of extraordinary
power and would have ordered Hamdi released if not charged
under traditional criminal law. 124 Only Justice Thomas agreed
that the executive's authority in foreign affairs and national security necessarily trumps the Court's power to review its accations, concluding that the Court lacked "the expertise and
125 In
determination."
executive's
pacity to second-guess the
Rasul v. Bush, decided the same day as Hamdi, the Supreme
Court rejected government claims of extraordinary power, this
time centered on the prisoners held at the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. 126 As in Hamdi, the Supreme Court reversed
lower court judgments that had been more deferential to government arguments.
Hamdi and Rasul suggest the courts may be less reluctant
than in past times of crisis to question government claims of
authority, but whether the courts will remain willing to "interfere" with executive power (the characterization is Justice
121.

124 S. Ct. 2633, 2645 (2004) (quoting the Brief for Respondents). The

government also argued that "Hamdi's incommunicado imprisonment as an
enemy combatant seized on the field of battle falls within the President's
power as Commander in Chief under the laws and usages of war." Id. at 265253 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
122. Id. at 2659.
123. Id. at 2655. In contrast to the majority holding, Justice Souter (and
Justice Ginsburg, concurring) would have found Hamdi's detention unauthorized either by the president's inherent authority or by congressional passage of
the Authorization for Use of Military Force and would therefore not have required any further showing by Hamdi to gain release from custody. See id. at
2653-60.
124. Id. at 2671-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
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Thomas's from his dissent in Hamdi)127 remains to be seen.
Signals are mixed so far. In Khalid v. Bush, 128 the first district
court hearing a habeas claim mandated by Rasul, Judge Richard J. Leon ruled against the petitioning Guantanamo prisoners, determining that they were entitled only to the legal process the executive branch gave them. "As a general rule ....

the

judiciary should not insinuate itself into foreign affairs and national security issues," Leon wrote. 129 "While a state of war certainly does not give the President a 'blank check,' and the
courts must have some role when individual liberty is at stake,
any role must be limited when, as here, there is an ongoing
armed conflict and the individuals challenging their detention
are non-resident aliens."' 30 In contrast, less than two weeks
later, in In re GuantanamoDetainee Cases, Judge Joyce Hens
Green ruled that procedures established by the government to
confirm enemy combatant status for the detainees at Guantanamo are unconstitutional violations of the prisoners' due
process rights.1 3 1 "Although this nation unquestionably must
take strong action under the leadership of the Commander in
Chief to protect itself against enormous and unprecedented
threats," she wrote, "that necessity cannot negate the existence
of the most basic fundamental rights for which the people of
this country have fought and died for well over two hundred
32

years."1

The courts' rhetoric in Hamdi, Rasul, and Guantanamo Detainee Cases indicate healthy skepticism of government claims
for plenary authority over foreign and military affairs and the
need to rein in civil liberties. To continue down that path,
courts will have to weather claims that they are interfering
with the country's security needs, perhaps in the face of future
terrorist acts on American soil. Even the assaults on a so-called
"activist judiciary," launched in the context of court decisions
on gay marriage and the Terri Schiavo case, may have an impact on the willingness of judges to play the crucial independent role they must play to maintain a responsible check on gov-

127. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2676.
128. No. CIV. 1: 04-1142 (RJL), 2005 WL 100924 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005).
129. Id. at *13.
130. Id. (internal citations omitted).
131. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Nos. CIV. A. 02-CV-0299CKK et
al., 2005 WL 195356 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2005).
132. Id. at *18.
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ernment authority in the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HISTORY
The final two essays focus attention on the international
arena itself. In Transforming InternationalLaw After the September 11 Attacks? Three Evolving Paradigms for Regulating
133 argues that SepInternational Terrorism, Laurence Helfer
tember 11 could, but need not, be seen as representing a para134 He redigm shift in the legal landscape of world affairs.
sponds to pre-September 11 arguments, notably by legal
scholar Richard Falk, that recent years have seen a shift from a
"state-centric legal order" to one in which individuals and nonterritorial actors maintain allegiances to "centralized structures above the state and to local communities and subnational
movements operating within it."'3 This, Falk suggests, repre-

sents a paradigmatic transformation, akin to the transition
from "a medieval world in which ecclesiastical authority dominated secular power to a world controlled by independent and
sovereign nation-states,"' 36 identified by seventeenth-century
Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius. Heifer disagrees:
I do not see the September 11 attacks as a "Grotian moment" that
changed the world order. Instead, their enduring legacy for international law is likely to be as a catalyst for both multilateral and unilateral efforts-sometimes consistent efforts, sometimes conflictual onesto recalibrate existing legal paradigms in light of the changed geostrategic climate that transborder private terrorist networks have engendered. 137

Helfer notes that there are three existing, and Heifer argues, adequate frameworks in international law for imposing
responsibility for the attacks of September 11, each of which
has been invoked in the past by the United States in response
to terror attacks: "terrorism as international crime," "terrorism
138 Helfer acas armed conflict," and "terrorism as atrocity."'
133.

Helfer is a professor of law and the Lloyd Tevis Fellow at the Loyola

Law School, Los Angeles.
134. Laurence R. Helfer, Transforming International Law After the September 11 Attacks? Three Evolving Paradigms for Regulating International
Terrorism, in SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 1, at 180.
135. Id. at 181. The view that we are moving from one paradigm to another
is based on the writings of Richard Falk over the past twenty years. See id. at
181 n.5.
136. Id. at 180-81.
137. Id. at 187-88.
138. Id. at 182.
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knowledges the drawbacks and limitations of these approaches. 3 9 First, treating terrorism as international crime is
grounded in an assumption that terrorists act without the support of state governments and that states will be willing and
able to fulfill obligations to identify, arrest, and either prosecute or extradite perpetrators-assumptions that do not hold
for the al Qaeda operatives sought by the United States. 14 0 Second, and more importantly, all three paradigms depend upon a
multilateralist view of the world, acknowledging and relying on
an international system that defines what constitutes unlawful
terrorism, unjustified armed conflict, or atrocity.' 4 ' After September 11, the United States has favored unilateral rather
than multilateral responses, rejecting standards and restraints
imposed through international agreements and understandings. 142 Such unilateral action by the United States is problematic within an international system of law meant for responding to terrorism in a unified, consistent fashion with broad
international support, Helfer notes. 143
But do these strains on extant frameworks for dealing with
terrorism as a matter of international law demonstrate a need
to replace them with a new vision? As Helfer notes, the failure
of the United States to invoke or act consistently with the
available international legal constructs may itself have a transforming influence on those constructs, even though its failure is
formally a breach of the multilateral rules rather than an interpretive act. 144 But he views the changes so far, even those
reflected in and resulting from September 11, as evolutionary
rather than paradigmatically transformative.145 International
law will no doubt "evolve in a post-September 11 world," he
notes. 146 The need to combat stateless terrorism is already leading to a "more robust condemnation of terrorism in international law extending beyond the suppression of specific wrongful acts,"'147 to the rethinking of definitions of atrocity for the

139. See id.
140. See id. at 183-85.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 184-85.
143. See id. at 185.
144. See id. at 182-86.
145. See id. at 180.
146. Id. at 182.
147. Id. at 186.
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purposes of international prosecution, 148 and to international
reconsideration and refinement of the appropriateness of the
use of force against states unable to control or exclude terrorists or against "autonomous terrorist networks who operate
across borders."'149 Helfer argues that such evolutionary change
is preferable, and more descriptive of reality, than the paradigmatic shift described by Falk and others.
In the final essay, Empire's Law: -Foreign Relations by
PresidentialFiat, Ruti Teitel' 5 0 concludes that, "we are indeed
in a constructed transformative moment" in the relationship
between law and politics. 15 ' In particular, she argues that the
legal responses of the Bush administration to September 11 are
operating to shift the political balance in the United States towards vesting more, and at times unreviewable, legal discretion
in foreign affairs in the executive. 52 She describes the debate
between the "war" and "justice" models that emerged immediately after September 11 but concludes that the debate hardly
mattered because the administration sought to follow neither
the laws of war nor domestic criminal or constitutional law, arguing instead for "exceptional" law that superceded either
model. 153 While calling the moment potentially "transformative," Teitel shows that those administration efforts may be
viewed as an extension of a direction already seen in the international arena in the waning days of the last century and the
first years of this one, a trend towards a politicized jurisprudence and the entrenchment of exceptional uses of the law to
justify interventions that would have previously been viewed as
illegitimate.15 4 Even within this context, 'however, she sees
Bush administration actions as claiming an extraordinary degree of control over the juridical standards. She cites the November 13, 2001, "military" order authorizing the "Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism," the administration's attempt to exercise
absolute control over the nature and scope of military tribunals

148. Id. at 187.
149. Id.

150. Teitel is the Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law at New
York Law School.
151. Ruti G.Teitel, Empire's Law: Foreign Relations by PresidentialFiat,
in SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 1, at 194.
152. See id. at 197-98.
153. Id. at 197.
154. See id. at 197-98.

1462

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:1437

to be used to try terrorism suspects. 155 In the order, the administration arrogates to itself the power to determine unilaterally and without review the definition of "terrorist" and to decide when and if such military tribunals would be
appropriate-and to pursue unilateral action internationally
and "to eschew the parameters of international law." 156 She
points in particular to the U.S. position vis-A-vis the International Criminal Court and its claim not that the United States
is above the law (which would be "characteristic of non-rule-oflaw states") but that its exception from the law "is grounded
from within the law and its enforcement."157 She finds the U.S.
position consistent with an overall attitude she calls "the U.S.
sovereign police logic," an attempt to view the United States as
outside the bounds of international law because of its position
as the "self-appointed world police."158 Teitel decries the move
towards operating free of constraint on the international scene
and "free of congressional oversight or constitutional checks" at
home, and she contends that the current "stat[e] of exception"
should be considered at best (or worst) "provisional accommodatio[n] subject to constitutional limitations," not "an occasion
for lawlessness."159 What makes her call all the more critical is
the possibility that the administration's declared war on terror
has no foreseeable end, given the nature of the terrorist threat
and the likelihood that today's wars and "enforcement actions"
will produce a perhaps unending stream of new recruits who
can operate anywhere in the world.
CONCLUSION
As should be evident from this Book Review, the essays in
this volume draw on the expertise of scholars from a wide variety of disciplines and range broadly, touching on subjects as
disparate as domestic and international law, the nature of Islamic theology and politics, understandings of citizenship, and
the balance between security and civil liberties. Each of the
topics presented has been, and will continue to be, the subject
of debate and discussion by the public and by experts in each of
the fields represented. The value of this volume lies in part in

155. Id. at 200 n.20.
156. Id. at 203-05.
157.

Id. at 205-06.

158. Id. at 207.
159. Id. at 207-08.
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bringing together such varying themes, all of them implicated
by the central and critical question addressed: what truly has
changed through the actions of the September 11 terrorists and
those who have followed them? The essays in this collection
raise concerns and voice cautions; they do not provide answers,
nor do they claim to do so. They provide a starting place, not an
endpoint, for analysis. But their analyses all point to one critical conclusion: it is not the actions of the terrorists that have
transformed the legal and political landscape, rather it is our
actions in response that threaten to do so. If we follow our leaders down the path of radical change, then September 11 will,
indeed, have been a watershed moment. The essays in this collection sharply delineate the risks involved in taking that path
and make clear that following that path is a choice, not an inevitability.

